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The concern for one’s and other’s image is crucial for diplomacy, informal contract enforcement, 
maintenance of business networks, good employment relationships, successful bargaining 
situations (Ting-Toomey, 2005). Yet, individuals or organizations’ image may be threatened by 
the development of practices like the dissemination of performance ratings that praise the best 
performers but may also shame the least performers. Examples include citation indices and 
rankings of researchers in academia, ranking of sellers on on-line purchasing websites, employee 
performance appraisals in organizations.1 The previous literature has focused on the implications 
of individual rankings on performance and efficiency, showing mixed results: While rankings 
motivate some individuals to outperform others, they may also discourage less able individuals. 
But another source of utility loss has not received much attention in the economic literature: 
rankings may entail losses of utility in terms of image that people may strive to avoid, and this is 
precisely what we are studying in this paper.  
If people make efforts to protect their own image, are they also willing to sacrifice monetary 
resources to save other’s face? Social psychologists have shown how preserving image is 
important for humans in society (Spencer et al., 2001; Baumeister et al., 2005; Mruk, 2006). 
Sociologists have studied how self-esteem and considerateness for others lead people to preserve 
self- and others’ face in social encounters. Goffman has defined face as “an image of self 
delineated in terms of approved social attributes” (2005, p.5), and shown that face-saving 
practices are a condition for social interactions. In contrast, economists have not widely 
investigated the importance of face-saving for the self and others.2 This study aims at 
contributing to understand face saving by combining the economic analysis of image and social 
preferences. Recent theories (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Koszegi, 2006) and empirical tests of 
image concern (Johansson-Stenman and Svedsater, 2012; Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 
                                                             
1 Many firms struggle to find a well-functioning performance evaluation system. Recently, well-known companies 
have abolished their annual performance review (Adobe) or moved from a rigid, forced ranking approach to systems 
that are more flexible (Microsoft, Yahoo). One aspect that is not recognized in the literature is the loss of face (self- 
as well as others’ image) associated with performance evaluations in which individuals’ ranks are publicly exposed. 
2 An exception is Hugh-Johns and Reinstein (2010) who study loss of face as the disutility for common-knowledge 
of rejection. The fear of losing face leads to inefficiencies in markets because it leads to fewer offers.  
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2005; Alpizar et al., 2008; Ariely et al., 2009; Lacera and Macis, 2010; Cappelen et al., 2012) 
demonstrate that individuals care about how others perceive their actions. People are motivated 
by what others think about them (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007, 2008a; Eriksson and Villeval, 
2011). These studies do not, however, directly examine the value for individuals to maintain self- 
and others’ face.  
In this paper, we study experimentally whether people sacrifice monetary resources to avoid 
being publicly exposed – i.e. to save face – when exposure signals that the individual’s 
performance is the lowest compared to others. Another original feature is analyzing how large is 
the share of individuals who accept incurring costs to save the face of others without reaping any 
personal material benefit from this action. Testing face saving would be very difficult by means 
of survey or registry data. Therefore, we have designed a laboratory experiment that we tested in 
China from where the concept of face (mien-tzu) originates (Ho, 1976).3 In the Minimal (group) 
Identity treatment subjects are matched in triads throughout the session and they have to perform 
a real-effort task for a fixed payment. In one part, those whose performance is lowest in their 
triad are singled out and briefly publicly exposed. Although the equilibrium is not exerting any 
effort, public exposure may be perceived as signaling a lower status. It is thus susceptible to 
shame individuals.4 It can however be avoided if at least two triad members are willing to pay a 
fee. This one-shot decision allows us to measure the likelihood of sacrificing resources to save 
one’s and others’ image.  
Our first contribution is showing that most individuals strive to save face and agree to 
sacrifice resources to avoid public exposure, and that more than half of the individuals also 
sacrifice to avoid others’ exposure. Such a behavior can be related to empathy, altruism 
(Andreoni and Miller, 2002) and norm enforcement to maintain the integrity of a society (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2003) in the domain of image. We show that altruistic behavior extends beyond 
                                                             
3 Face is a key dimension in the Confucian culture to orchestrate social interactions (Hu, 1944; Redding and Ng, 1982; 
Yang, 1989; Qi, 2011). The concern of Chinese for face results from a socialization process using shaming techniques 
to inculcate strong sensitivity to group belonging and others’ opinion (Redding and Ng, 2002). The concern for others’ 
image is called “giving face” in Chinese.  
4 We kept the procedure as soft as possible to avoid creating too much embarrassment. In psychology, Smith et al. 
(2002) have shown that shame has two core features: its links with public exposure and with negative self-evaluation. 
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the pecuniary realm and includes taking actions that benefit the social standing of others.  
Then, we investigate whether the willingness to avoid others’ exposure is sensitive to the 
saliency of group identity. Indeed, the link between identity, on the one hand, and face, on the 
other hand, has been little explored in the literature (Spencer-Oatey, 2007). Therefore, we study 
whether individuals are more willing to pay for saving the face of group members rather than the 
face of strangers, and the face of in-groups than the face of out-groups. By addressing these 
questions, we contribute to the recent economic literature on group identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000; Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Bernhard et al., 2006; Charness et 
al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Chen and Chen, 2011; Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009; Zizzo, 
2011; Goette et al., 2012; Masella et al., 2014).  
While in the Minimal Identity treatment triad membership induces a minimal group identity, 
in other treatments we vary the strength of group identity. We manipulate the social distance in 
several directions, either reducing it by adding a “label identity” to triad members, or increasing it 
by withdrawing the notion of triads. We enhanced group identity in the same spirit as Chen and 
Chen (2011) in their study of the role of identity in the selection of equilibria in coordination 
games. To reinforce the prominence of group membership we gave painter names to groups, like 
in the method developed in social psychology by Tajfel et al. (1971) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), 
and like Chen and Chen (2011) we added an opportunity for the players to communicate during 
the identity formation stage. In the Homogenous (label) treatment, the triad members share the 
same label (Klee or Kandinsky, as explained below), while in the Heterogeneous (label) 
treatment labels are mixed within each triad. In these two treatments, triads remain fixed 
throughout the session. In contrast, in the No (group) Identity treatment we no longer mention the 
notion of triad and individuals are matched with two randomly rematched participants at the 
beginning of each new part. In one part individuals can still pay for avoiding the exposure of the 
least performer among themselves and two other co-participants but in contrast with the Minimal 
Identity treatment these co-participants are strangers. This removes any potential reputation 
concerns. When people hold the same label the social distance should be reduced, while it should 
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increase when they do not, compared to the Minimal Identity treatment. These treatments allow 
us to identify whether there is a conflict between a general norm of saving others’ face and 
another norm according to which one should save the face of in-groups but not of out-groups. We 
can thus measure how image management is affected by group membership. 
Our second contribution is showing that, compared to the Minimal Identity treatment, 
strengthening group identity or creating heterogeneous groups makes no significant difference 
with respect to the choice to save one’s and other’s face. People are willing to help out-group as 
much as in-group members in their triad. The analysis of communication during the identity 
formation stage indicates that asking and receiving help during this stage does not affect 
significantly the decision to save others’ face in any treatment during the game. In the No Identity 
treatment, more than one third of the individuals are still willing to help to save a stranger’s face 
but this proportion is significantly lower than in the other treatments. These findings show a 
major role of the triad identity relative to an interpretation in terms of moral norms which would 
have required finding a similar proportion of sacrifices across treatments. This lower empathy for 
strangers may be driven by a higher social distance with others when there is no group identity 
and by the absence of reputation concerns (although when triads are fixed, players are also 
unaware of the content of the next part when they decide to pay the fee for avoiding exposure). 
The absence of a correlation between receiving help during the identity building part and helping 
others in the game suggests that general reciprocity is not driving the difference between the 
identity and the no identity treatments. 
Finally, we examine how public exposure affects effort. Ex ante, the threat on image may 
either crowd-out intrinsic motivation or boost performance to avoid exposure. For example, 
taxpayers are more compliant when detection of fraud leads to the public display of the evaders’ 
pictures (Coricelli et al., 2010). Ex post, the shaming effect of public exposure may also either 
crowd-in intrinsic motivation if individuals work harder to restore their image, or crowd-out it if 
image has been altered (Coricelli et al., 2014). We carry out performance comparisons between 
each treatment and a No Feedback treatment in which subjects do not receive any social 
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information and have no risk of public exposure. This additional treatment allows us to 
disentangle the effect of learning across parts and the effect of social information and exposure 
on performance. We fail to find evidence of an ex ante effect of the threat of exposure on 
performance, but we establish some evidence that having been exposed tends to reduce 
immediate future performance at both the individual and the triad levels. In contrast to Masella et 
al. (2014) who found that identity modulates the impact of incentives schemes on performance, 
we find no effect of group identity on the impact of exposure on performance. 
Overall, these findings have implications for the importance of protecting people’s face and 
for firms to avoid modes of evaluation or feedback policies that may threaten the social image of 
individuals in the organization or the society. 
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 summarizes the related literature. Section 3 
describes the experimental design and procedures and presents our behavioral conjectures. 
Section 4 reports our findings and Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.  
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Our paper contributes to three literatures. One is studies of identification and audience effects. 
These studies have shown that prosocial choices are affected by identification (Bohnet and Frey, 
1999; Charness and Gneezy, 2008) and anticipated verbal feedback (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 
2008b), and that punishment in public promotes norm obedience (Xiao and Houser, 2011). While 
these studies ensure the anonymity of interactions, our design exposes singled-out individuals to 
an audience. The presence of a non-anonymous audience has been shown to increase prosociality 
(Ariely et al., 2009), tax compliance (Coricelli et al., 2010), coordination on the audience’s 
preferred outcome in the battle-of-sexes game and defection in the prisoner’s dilemma (Charness 
et al., 2007), and inflation of stated self-assessment (Ewers and Zimmerman, 2015). These 
studies point to the importance of social approval.5 Our analysis complements them by 
                                                             
5 There is also a literature on the willingness-to-pay for privacy, showing that people are less willing to disclose 
personal information when information is more sensitive (Feri et al., 2013), or in the absence of economic advantage 
associated with disclosure (Beresford et al., 2012). While we are also concerned with the privacy of sensitive data, 
we differ from this literature in which disclosure is voluntary.  
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examining whether people sacrifice resources to preserve image. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on group identity. In naturally occurring groups, 
in-group favoritism has been observed in norm enforcement (Bernhard et al. (2006) because of 
social ties (Goette et al., 2006, 2012a). Discrimination of the opposite group has been identified 
both in dictator games (Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Abbink and Harris, 2012) and competition games 
(Goette et al., 2012b; Kato and Shu, 2013). Using the minimal group paradigm, studies have 
shown that group identity strengthens prosocial behavior (Chen and Li, 2009) while people act 
more selfishly when opposed to out-groups (Kollock, 1998; Charness et al., 2007; Zizzo, 2011), 
and that trust decreases with group membership because of discrimination against out-groups 
(Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009).6 It has also been shown that making group identity more 
salient can lead to in-group coordination to the efficient equilibrium in a minimum effort game 
(Chen and Chen, 2011). Our contribution is a study of whether face saving is a general norm or a 
discriminatory process conditional on the social distance with the victim. We also contribute to 
the analysis of the impact of the group identity saliency on this type of pro-social behavior. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on the incentive effects of social status. Status can be 
conferred by public recognition, performance feedback and ranking. These measures act as 
incentives on effort (Kosfeld and Neckerman, 2011; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012; Tran and 
Zeckhauser, 2012; Bradler et al., 2013) and cooperation (Eckel et al., 2010), although their effect 
is not unequivocal (Barankay, 2012; Charness et al., 2014). By singling-out the least productive 
individuals we can examine the impact of anticipated decreased status on further performance.7  
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
3.1. Treatments 
The experiment consists of four main treatments: a Minimal Identity treatment and three 
                                                             
6 This is not systematic, however, as the impact of group identity on behavior is conditional on the saliency of 
identity (Eckel and Grossman, 2005), the procedure used to generate identity (Guala et al., 2013), the group size 
(Harris et al., 2009), the mode of group formation (Herbst et al., 2012), the existence of inter-group conflicts 
(Chakravarty and Fonseca, 2011), and culture (Buchan et al., 2009). 
7 By means of a trust game, Galeotti and Zizzo (2014) analyze the impact of singling-out individuals depending on 
whether it is random or it results from people’s preferences. Singling-out individuals reduces trustworthiness and 
majority group members discriminate against singled-out subjects. 
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treatments in which we either remove or increase the saliency of group identity. A final treatment 
has been added to control for learning and the evolution of performance over time.  
Minimal Identity treatment 
Each session consists of four parts and players are informed about the content of a part only at the 
beginning of each part (see instructions in Appendices 1 and 2). At the beginning of the first part, 
we randomly form anonymous triads that remain fixed for the entire session, and this is common 
knowledge. In each part, subjects have to perform a simple task during four minutes. More 
precisely, they have to pick an apple on the screen and move it into a collecting basket located at 
the bottom of the screen. As soon as an apple enters the basket, a new apple appears at a random 
spot on the screen. Each apple moved into the basket earns one point. A counter displays the 
current score. The task does not require any skill and the score is a proxy of the level of effort.8 
Subjects receive a fixed wage of 100 ECU (Yuan 10, about U.S. $1.65) in each of the four parts. 
 Parts differ from each other in terms of feedback and risk of exposure. At the end of part 1, 
subjects learn their own score. At the end of part 2, they are also informed about the score and the 
rank of each member in their triad, with rank 1 assigned to the best performer and rank 3 to the 
least performer. In case of ties, ranks are assigned randomly between the ties. At the end of part 3, 
they receive the same type of feedback about their performance in part 3. Moreover, subjects with 
rank 3 based on their relative performance in part 3 are requested to move to the front of the room 
one by one before coming back to their seat. These rules are made common information in the 
instructions. Public exposure can, however, be waived if at least two triad members choose to pay 
to avoid the public exposure of the member with rank 3.9 In this case, 10 ECU are deducted from 
the payoff of those who chose to pay. If less than two triad members chose to pay the fee, the 
member with rank 3 is publicly exposed and no deduction is made. Each member is informed 
                                                             
8 Using a task in which a low performance would signal low cognitive ability would have generated more 
embarrassment in case of exposure, which we wanted to avoid for ethical reasons. Thus, the intensity of shame due 
to public exposure in a professional or educational environment is probably underestimated in our experiment. 
9 This raises a coordination issue in the group that will be studied later. To avoid this coordination problem, an 
alternative design could have been to randomly choose one of the triad members’ decisions to determine the 
exposure of the least performer. However, uncertainty of implementation would have limited the feeling of 
responsibility and probably reduced the willingness to pay for avoiding exposure. 
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about each triad member’s decision whether to offer to pay or not. Finally, part 4 replicates the 
features of part 2: after performing the task again during four minutes, subjects are informed on 
the score and rank of each triad member based on their relative performance in part 4. But in 
contrast to part 3, there is no risk of exposure.10 Since subjects discover the content of each part 
sequentially, they cannot adjust their effort strategically in part 2 to manipulate others’ beliefs 
about the effort in the triad in part 3. 
We elicited the emotional state of the subjects by using a self-reported emotion survey as in 
Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009). Although we are chiefly interested in the feelings of shame and 
happiness, at several steps11 subjects report the intensity of ten emotions that they may 
experience at this precise moment (anger, contempt, shame, envy, sadness, happiness, guilt, 
gratefulness, fear, relief) on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7 (the highest possible intensity). 
Homogeneous/Heterogeneous Label treatments 
In the Minimal Identity treatment, belonging to a triad may generate a group identity. To explore 
whether the willingness to save others’ face is affected by the social distance between members, 
we have designed two conditions of a treatment in which we add another group affiliation that is 
congruent or not with the triad membership. In the homogeneous label condition (hereafter, 
“Homogenous treatment”), triads are formed of subjects who received the same label (Klee or 
Kandinsky).12 Thus, group identity deriving from triad membership is reinforced and social 
distance is further reduced. In the heterogeneous label condition (hereafter, “Heterogeneous 
treatment”), triads are formed of subjects who received different labels. Thus, compared to the 
Minimal Identity treatment, social distance may be increased in the triad if the least performer 
has a different label than the other triad members. 
                                                             
10 We acknowledge that the impact of exposure on image cannot be disentangled precisely from that of lifting 
anonymity or the displeasure to stand in front of the public. But if the decision to sacrifice was motivated by the lift 
of anonymity or the displeasure of exposure and not because of image concerns, then it should be independent of the 
rank of the exposed player. We will show later that this is not what we observe, thanks to an additional treatment 
similar to the Baseline, except that it is the best performer who is publicly exposed unless at least one player pays to 
avoid exposure (N=36). 
11  That is at the beginning of the session, after receiving feedback at the end of part 1, at the end of part 2, during 
part 3 after choosing to pay to avoid public exposure, after the exposure stage, and at the end of part 4.  
12 Note that, as far as we know, we are the first to use these Klee-Kandinsky labels in China. 
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Labels are assigned in a preliminary part for the whole session, using a procedure inspired 
by the minimal group paradigm of Tajfel (1971). This part consists of two stages. In the first 
stage, subjects are randomly assigned to one of two groups of similar size, named the Kandinsky 
group and the Klee group, respectively. In the second stage, they engage in a recognition task. 
They review five pairs of paintings created by Klee and Kandinsky respectively, during 20 
seconds each. The screen indicates which artist painted each painting. Next, they review two 
anonymous paintings successively and they are requested to report which artist painted each of 
them (Klee or Kandinsky). Each correct answer pays 50 ECU. Before entering their individual 
responses, like in Chen and Chen (2011) subjects have the opportunity to communicate with their 
in-groups by means of a chat box to try to solve the problems. They can chat during three minutes. 
They receive a feedback on the correctness of answers at the end of the session.13  
Once labels have been assigned, the rest of the experiment is similar to the Minimal Identity 
treatment except that individuals are aware of the composition of their triad in terms of group 
identity and that publicly exposed individuals have to indicate aloud their label. Like in the 
Minimal Identity treatment, triad members are identified by their ranking and their score, as well 
as whether they are members of the Klee or Kandinsky group, but the group members remain 
anonymous. 
No Identity treatment 
In the No Identity treatment, subjects are not working in a triad. In each part starting after part 1, 
we compare their performance with the performance of two other randomly selected subjects in 
the same session, and we rematch players randomly in each new part. Subjects are asked whether 
they are willing to pay for avoiding the exposure of the least performer among the three subjects 
who are matched together in part 3, knowing that these subjects are likely not the same as in the 
previous part. Therefore, the social distance with the potentially exposed least performer is higher 
                                                             
13 To check whether the group inducement mechanism was effective, subjects had to report their feeling intensity of 
belonging to their group, with 1 referring to no feeling of group membership at all and 7 referring to a very strong 
feeling of group membership. The average reported number is 5.03, which indicates that the mechanism worked.  
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compared to the Minimal Identity treatment and since players are strangers, there is no possible 
reputation concern. With these manipulations, we can measure whether the decision to sacrifice 
to save face is dependent on social distance and reputation. 
No Feedback treatment 
Comparisons of performance in parts 1 and 2 reveal whether individuals adjust effort when they 
anticipate being informed about their relative performance. Comparing performance in parts 2 
and 3 indicates whether the perspective of being publicly exposed boosts effort or crowds-out 
intrinsic motivation. Finally, comparing performance in parts 3 and 4 measures whether exposure 
has a detrimental effect on effort in part 4. However, this interpretation is conditional on people 
not learning the task over time. To control for learning across parts, we have run a control 
treatment. This treatment includes the same number of parts and players are matched in triads as 
in the other treatments. But in contrast to the other treatments, there is no risk of public exposure 
and participants do not receive any feedback on any of the other’s performance in any part. The 
only information they get at the end of each part is their own score. The comparison between this 
treatment and the Minimal Identity treatment helps us to disentangle the impact of learning and 
the impact of social information and exposure on performance. 
Belief elicitation  
Requiring that two out of three triad members pay the fee to avoid exposure may give rise to a 
coordination problem. We have therefore elicited the participants’ beliefs about the number of 
other triad members who will choose to pay the fee (0, 1 or 2). This question was asked just after 
the individuals made their decision in part 3 and it was not mentioned in the instructions to avoid 
focusing attention on the coordination issue. A correct prediction paid 50 ECU. This question has 
been introduced after the first eight sessions. 
3.2. Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory of Beijing Normal University, 
Beijing, China. Posters inviting students to participate were posted on online campus forums of 
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BNU and Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications and flyers were distributed on the 
campuses. In total 420 students from various disciplines participated in 24 sessions with 18 
participants in each (12 only in the sessions with the No Feedback treatment). Table 1 reports 
summary statistics on sessions. The proportion of female participants exceeds 50% in all 
treatments (binomial test, p<0.001); thus we control for a possible gender effect in the regression 
analysis.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
The experiment was computerized using the REGATE software. Upon arrival, subjects were 
randomly assigned to a computer. Talking was not allowed. Instructions were distributed and read 
aloud after completion of each part. We checked that each subject understood correctly the 
instructions and all questions were answered in private. Before the beginning of the first part, 
subjects were allowed to practice the task during two minutes to minimize learning effects during 
the rest of the session. Each session lasted about 90 minutes, including a final demographic survey 
and payment in private. Subjects earned on average 45 Yuan ($7.38), which corresponds to 
approximately a 90 minute-wage for a part-time job in Beijing. 
3.3. Behavioral conjectures 
Predictions based on standard theory with selfish preferences and purely extrinsic motivation are 
straightforward. Since individuals are paid a fixed wage, they should exert no effort in any part. 
Individuals should not pay to avoid exposure and the threat of exposure should not affect effort 
since exposure does not impact payoffs. These predictions hold for all treatments and conditions.  
    However, instead of maximizing their monetary payoff, individuals may try to maximize 
their utility that depends on several sources of motivation. In particular, as in Benabou and Tirole 
(2006), an individual’s utility may depend on extrinsic motivation (how much he values money), 
intrinsic motivation (how much he enjoys performing the task), and image motivation (how much 
he cares about his own and other’s exposure). Utility is affected negatively by the variable cost of 
providing effort and the fixed cost of preserving image if the individual actually pays the fee. 
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Image motivation enters negatively in the utility function if one assumes that public exposure 
entails a loss of image. An individual with image concern will suffer a loss if he is exposed or if 
somebody else is exposed, but this loss is expected to be higher when he experiences exposure 
himself. Of course, there should be no image utility loss if the individual has no image concern or 
if exposure is waived. Thus, when deciding whether or not to pay the fee, the individual 
compares the amount of this fee to the image loss he would suffer in case of public exposure, 
accounting for his belief about other triad members’ decisions to pay the fee. Moreover, avoiding 
the loss of image should create an additional incentive to exert effort in part 3 for the triad 
members who learn that there is a risk of being exposed. Finally, actual exposure in part 3 may 
crowd-out the effort of the exposed triad members in part 4 if they feel they have lost face; this 
crowding-out effect is more unlikely for the other triad members since exposure means that they 
were not willing to pay to avoid this exposure. 
We summarize our initial conjectures as follows:
 
Conjecture 1 (Sacrifice). Image-concerned individuals are more likely to pay the fee for avoiding 
their own exposure than for avoiding the exposure of another member. 
Conjecture 2 (Effort). Ex ante, the cost of exposure in terms of image increases the individuals’ 
level of effort when they learn that there is a risk of being exposed. Ex post, exposure crowds-out 
the intrinsic motivation of the least performer in the triad. 
Manipulating group identity should have no impact on the willingness to pay the fee if 
saving others’ face is a general social norm. Alternatively, the utility loss experienced may 
depend on the identity of the subject at risk. Indeed, compared to the Minimal Identity treatment 
the loss may be higher when the individual at risk is an in-group and lower when he is an 
out-group or a stranger. Manipulating group identity may also affect the beliefs about others’ 
decision to pay the fee, increasing them when the least performer is an in-group, decreasing them 
when the least performer is an out-group or a stranger. It may help solving the coordination 
problem regarding who should pay the fee in heterogeneous triads, as an individual should be 
more likely to pay the fee when the least performer is an in-group and the other triad member an 
out-group. Additionally, effort may be affected by the composition of the group, except if saving 
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face is a general social norm. Being matched with out-groups or strangers may boost performance 
to reduce the risk of being the least performer, as one may expect less help from others in these 
conditions.    
We summarize the next conjectures as follows: 
Conjecture 3 (Sacrifice and identity). The decision to pay the fee is more likely when the least 
performer belongs to the same triad or holds the same label than when he is an out-group or a 
stranger.  
Conjecture 4 (Effort and identity). Being matched with out-groups in the Heterogeneous 
treatment boosts effort even further if individuals are more willing to report the risk of exposure 
on to out-groups. 
5. RESULTS 
We first examine the decision to pay for avoiding public exposure. Next, we focus on the 
emotions reported by the subjects and finally, we study efficiency as measured by effort levels. 
5.1. Avoidance of public exposure 
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the payment of the fee to avoid the public exposure of the 
least performer, by treatment and by performance rank in the triad in part 3. The last column 
gives the percentage of least performers who are actually exposed. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Table 2 shows that, on average, 75% of the least performers in the Minimal Identity 
treatment are willing to pay to avoid being publicly exposed. This percentage is 80.95% in the 
Homogeneous treatment, 71.43% in the Heterogeneous treatment, and 62.50% in the No Identity 
treatment. Pairwise proportion tests indicate that these values do not differ from the Minimal 
Identity treatment (two-sided, p=0.569, 0.754, and 0.350, respectively). This is confirmed by a 
Kruskal-Wallis test (p=0.853). Thus, most subjects are willing to avoid exposure.14  
                                                             
14 This is confirmed by the players’ reports of their reasons for their decisions in the post-experimental survey. A 
majority responded that they chose to pay to avoid the least performers’ losing face or feeling embarrassed.  
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Table 2 also shows that in the Minimal Identity treatment a majority of subjects who are not 
personally at risk of public exposure (54.17% of the best and the medium performers) choose to 
pay to waive the exposure of the least performer in their triad. This documents the importance of 
saving others’ face.15 Interestingly, there is no significant difference between this percentage and 
the percentage in the Homogeneous treatment (58.33%, p=0.642) and in the Heterogeneous 
treatment, regardless of whether the subject at risk is an in-group (60.61%, p=0.565) or an 
out-group (52.94%, p=0.903) (pairwise comparisons, two-sided proportion tests). A 
Kruskal-Wallis test confirms that there are no significant differences between the Minimal 
Identity treatment and the other treatments (p=0.862). To explain the lack of behavioral 
differences between the Homogeneous and the Heterogeneous treatments, we explored the 
content of communication during the group identity formation stage. A comparison of the 
percentages of subjects asking for help and receiving help from others is not significantly 
different in the Homogeneous treatment (28.57%) and the Heterogeneous treatment (22.22%) 
(proportion test with each painting group taken as an independent observation, p=0.700). 
Moreover, we find no significant difference either in the decision to pay the fee to save the least 
performer’s face between the subjects who asked and got help during the group identity 
formation stage (66.67% in the Homogeneous treatment and 71.43% in the Heterogeneous 
treatment, respectively) and those who did not (65.56% and 58.16%, respectively) (proportion 
tests, p=0.905 and 0.204, respectively. This indicates that in our game general reciprocity is not 
the driver of helping behavior.16 
Another important finding is that the percentage of subjects who are not at risk personally 
and who are willing to pay the fee in the No Identity treatment is 37.50%. Two-sided proportion 
tests indicate that this differs from the Minimal Identity treatment (p=0.101), the Homogeneous 
treatment (p=0.021) and the Heterogeneous treatment when the least performer is an in-group 
                                                             
15 An alternative explanation is that the best and the medium performers’ decision to pay is driven by potential 
shame if choosing not to pay since their decision is visible to the other triad members. However, the emotional data 
do not support this explanation: there is no significant difference in shame and happiness intensity between the best 
and the medium performers who chose to pay and those who made the opposite choice.  
16 Note that this is different from Chen and Chen (2011) who found that subjects asking more questions to their 
in-groups during the problem-solving task were more (less) cooperative with their in-(out-)groups in the main game.  
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(p=0.041). The percentage is significantly lower than when the least performer is an out-group 
but only if we consider a one-sided test (p=0.065). A Kruskal-Wallis test indicates a significant 
difference between the No Identity treatment and the other treatments (p=0.017). Although this 
percentage is lower than in most of the other treatments, it should still be considered remarkably 
high since in this treatment the social distance with the least performer is larger than in most 
other treatments.17 
As a consequence, the proportion of least performers who are actually publicly exposed 
varies from 28.57% in the Homogeneous treatment, 33.33% in the Heterogeneous treatment, 
37.50% in the Minimal Identity treatment, to 66.67% in the No Identity treatment. Proportion 
tests indicate that there is no significant difference between the first three treatments (p>0.100) 
while the No Identity treatment differs from the Minimal Identity treatment (p=0.043), the 
Homogeneous treatment (p=0.003) and the Heterogeneous treatment (p=0.009). 
In accordance with Conjecture 1, people are more likely to incur a cost for avoiding their 
own exposure than for waiving the exposure of another member. Indeed, tests confirm that the 
proportion of subjects who choose to pay the fee is higher among those who are at risk than 
among others (one-sided, p=0.044 in the Minimal Identity treatment, p=0.006 in the Homogenous 
treatment, p=0.046 in the Heterogeneous treatment, and p=0.022 in the No Identity treatment). 
The least performers hold also more pessimistic beliefs about the number of members who 
choose to pay.18 
Table 3 reports an analysis of the determinants of the decision to pay the fee to prevent the 
public exposure of the least performer. It displays marginal effects from the estimates of five 
                                                             
17 The analysis of beliefs indicates, however, that the individuals are more pessimistic about others’ willingness to 
pay the fee when they are matched with out-groups rather than with in-groups. The mean beliefs about the number of 
other triad members choosing to pay the fee are 1.36 (S.D.=0.68) in the Minimal Identity treatment, 1.42 (S.D.=0.73) 
in the Homogenous treatment, 1.11 (S.D.=0.74) in the Heterogeneous treatment, and 1.22 (S.D.=0.75) in the No 
Identity treatment. Beliefs differ significantly between the Heterogeneous treatment on the one hand and the Minimal 
Identity treatment (p=0.096) and the Homogenous treatment (p=0.010) on the other hand (Mann-Whitney tests with 
each participant taken as one independent observation). They do not differ between the No Identity treatment and the 
other treatments (p>0.100). 
18 The mean beliefs of the least performers are 1.08 (S.D.=0.67) in the Minimal Identity treatment, 1.25 (S.D.=0.79) 
in the Homogenous treatment, 0.87 (S.D.=0.74) in the Heterogeneous treatment, and 0.83 (S.D.=0.76) in the No 
Identity treatment. They are significantly more pessimistic than others in the Minimal Identity treatment (p=0.070), 
Heterogeneous (p=0.057) and No Identity treatments (p=0.002) (Mann-Whitney tests), not in the Homogeneous 
treatment (p=0.185). 
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Probit models. In model (1), the independent variables include a dummy variable for each 
treatment, with the Minimal Identity treatment taken as the reference category. They include a 
dummy variable for the sessions in which we elicited beliefs on the number of triad members 
willing to pay the fee and two dummy variables indicating whether the subject has got the first or 
the third rank, respectively, with the second rank taken as the reference. Model (2) augments 
model (1) with two variables capturing the beliefs that one or two other triad members choose to 
pay the fee (compared to none) interacted with the dummy variable for the belief elicitation 
condition. The aim is to test whether subjects try to solve a coordination problem, i.e. whether 
they are more (less) likely to pay the fee when they believe that one (two) other triad member 
will pay. Model (3) re-estimates model (2) on the sub-sample of the least performers. We include 
an additional dummy variable indicating whether the least performer is matched with two 
out-groups in the Heterogeneous treatment. Model (4) re-estimates model (2) on the sub-sample 
of the best and medium performers, after including a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
least performer is an out-group in the Heterogeneous treatment. Finally, model (5) restricts the 
observations to the best and medium performers in the Heterogeneous treatment. It tests the 
hypothesis that the subject’s willingness to sacrifice is reduced when being matched with two 
out-groups and when the least performer is the only out-group in the triad. The reference category 
is the case in which the least performer is the subject’s in-group. It also controls for the belief 
elicitation condition and the belief on the number of other triad members willing to pay the fee.19 
In the five models, we control for demographic variables, including gender, age and family 
relative wealth. As these variables were never significant, we omit reporting their marginal 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the triad level, except in model (3) since here we only 
consider one player per triad. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
                                                             
19 This last variable replaces the separate belief variables included in the previous models because there is not 
enough variation in the decision to pay the fee when the subjects believe that the two other members will pay. 52.78% 
of subjects with rank 1 or 2 are willing to pay in the condition where we do not elicit beliefs, 25% when they believe 
that none of the two others will pay, 33.33% when they believe that one will pay but 100% when they believe that 
the two others will pay.   
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Model (2) shows that a least performer is 24.13% more likely to choose to pay the fee than a 
subject who receives the second rank, with no difference between subjects who get ranks 1 and 2, 
respectively. This again supports Conjecture 1. Second, models (1) and (2) indicate that being in 
a triad with in-groups only (i.e., in the Homogeneous treatment) or with out-groups (i.e., in the 
Heterogeneous treatment) does not affect the willingness to pay the fee as compared to the 
Minimal Identity treatment, controlling or not for the beliefs about others’ willingness to pay the 
fee. In contrast, in the No Identity treatment, the willingness to pay the fee is reduced by 16.19% 
compared to the Minimal Identity treatment. The difference between the No Identity and the 
Minimal Identity treatments is, however, not significant for the least performers (model (3)).  
The third finding relates to the triad configuration in terms of group identity in the 
Heterogeneous treatment. In this treatment, neither the least performers (model (3)) nor the other 
members (models (4) and (5)) condition their decision to pay on the triad composition. This does 
not support Conjecture 3.  
The fourth finding is related to beliefs. While model (1) shows that eliciting beliefs did not 
change subjects’ behavior, all the other models find that subjects’ willingness to help increases in 
the number of triad members they believe will also pay. For example, model (2) shows that, 
compared to the condition where we did not elicit beliefs, predicting that no one will pay 
decreases one’s willingness to pay by 29.30%, predicting that one other member will pay 
increases it by 19.76%, and predicting that the two other members will pay even increases it by 
62.95%. For the least performers (model (3)), these percentages are -26.89%, 40.41% and 
46.23%, respectively. For the best and medium performers (model (4)), believing that one other 
member will pay has no impact, but believing that the two others will pay increases one’s own 
willingness to pay by 57.76%, while believing that no one is paying reduces this willingness by 
22.09%. This rejects an interpretation in terms of coordination which would require that one is 
more willing to pay when expecting that a single other member will sacrifice. Our finding 
suggests instead that subjects who think that several others are willing to pay are also more 
willing to sacrifice because image has an important value and so, preserving it in a group is a 
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norm.20 
We summarize these findings as follows: 
Result 1: A large majority of individuals sacrifice resources to avoid public exposure and their 
motivation is stronger when the beliefs about the intensity of help expected from others are 
higher. 
Result 2: A smaller majority of individuals are willing to sacrifice to waive the exposure of other 
people. 
Results 1 and 2 support Conjecture 1.  
Result 3: Even when there is no group identity, more than one third of subjects are still willing to 
preserve others’ face. But this is lower than in the treatments with group identity. In contrast, 
increasing the saliency of group identity by means of labels has little impact on behavior.  
This result does not support Conjecture 3. 
5.2. Emotions 
In this section we explore whether the strong willingness to preserve one’s and others’ face is 
driven by the fact that the ranking of subjects and the threat of exposure generate more 
unpleasant and less pleasurable emotions. Figures 1 and 2 display the evolution of self-reported 
levels of shame and happiness over time, by subjects’ rank in part 3, and according to actual 
public exposure of the least performers. We consider the feelings reported at the beginning of the 
session, after receiving feedback on one’s score in part 1, after receiving feedback on scores and 
ranks in part 2, after deciding on paying the fee in part 3, after the public exposure of the least 
performers, and after the feedback on scores and ranks in part 4. All non-parametric tests reported 
here are two-sided and consider each individual as an independent observation. 
(Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here) 
The figures show no difference in shame and happiness between the categories of subjects at 
the beginning of the session or when receiving feedback in part 1 (Mann-Whitney tests – MW 
                                                             
20 In other regressions not reported here but available upon request, we also controlled for the difference in scores 
between the player and the least performer in the triad. The coefficient of this variable is never significant. Helping 
to save face is not conditional on differences in effort. 
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hereafter -, p>0.010 in pairwise comparisons). When learning their rank in part 2, the least 
performers in part 3 start experiencing more shame and less happiness than subjects with rank 1 
or 2 (MW, p<0.001), while the best performers in part 3 start experiencing more happiness than 
the others (MW, p<0.001).21 The figures show that the least performers’ emotions are 
exacerbated in part 3 when learning their risk of being exposed. In this part too, the differences 
with the levels of emotions reported by the other players are significant (MW, p<0.001). 
The figures reveal three interesting findings about the emotions experienced after public 
exposure. First, the publicly exposed subjects report a level of shame similar to the level reported 
before knowing the decision of their triad members (Wilcoxon test – W hereafter -, p=0.522); this 
suggests that anticipatory feelings are as strong as those experienced at the time of exposure. 
Their level of shame decreases in part 4 compared to the moment of exposure (W test, p=0.008) 
without returning to its initial level when receiving the same type of feedback, such as in part 2 
(W test, p=0.033), suggesting that it takes time to dissipate. Second, the least performers who 
have not been exposed experience an immediate decrease of their shame intensity at the time of 
exposure compared to when waiting for the decision of their triad members (W test, p<0.001) 
while their level of happiness peaks and exceeds that reported by the best performers (MW test, 
p=0.005). In part 4 they still report a level of happiness that is higher than that reported by those 
who have been exposed (MW test, p=0.004). They may feel satisfaction from seeing that others 
helped them. Finally, the best performers in part 3 report a sharp decrease in happiness when the 
least performers are publicly exposed compared to when they decide to pay the fee (W test, 
p<0.001), which suggests empathy.  
Of course, these feelings could be driven by the fact that individuals dislike being singled 
out, independently of any signaling value of a lower relative performance. Two elements suggest 
that this interpretation is not the most likely. First, the least performers’ shame increases and their 
happiness decreases already between part 1 (when receiving feedback on own score) and part 2 
                                                             
21 There is indeed a relative stability in ranks across parts. 63% of the best performers in part 3 received already rank 
1 in part 1, 74% received rank 1 both in part 2 and in part 4. 65% of the least performers in part 3 received already 
rank 3 in part 1, 76% in part 2, and 74% in part 4.  
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(when learning also the rank) (W tests, both p<0.001), signaling that a lower rank generates a 
change in emotions. Second, we ran two sessions of a game similar to the Minimal Identity 
treatment, except that it is the best performer who is publicly exposed unless at least one player 
pays to avoid exposure (N=36). In this treatment the percentage of best performers paying to 
avoid public praise is 33.33% (4 out of 12). A binomial test indicates that the probability to pay 
the fee for the least performers in the Minimal Identity treatment is significantly higher than this 
percentage (p<0.001). We can reasonably conclude that what people try to avoid is mainly the 
exposure of a lower performance.    
We summarize our analysis as follows:  
Result 4: Both the individuals threatened by potential exposure and those actually exposed 
express more shame and decreased happiness. Subjects who are not threatened also report a 
decrease in happiness at the moment of exposure. Empathy may be the mechanism behind the 
decision to sacrifice to preserve others’ face. 
5.3. Evolution of performance levels 
To study whether image influences performance, and thus efficiency, Table 4 displays descriptive 
statistics on the mean individual performance in each part in the No Feedback treatment (with no 
social information and no exposure) and in each other treatment for all subjects, and then only for 
the least performers in part 3 according to whether they were or not exposed (excluding the No 
Feedback treatment). As a complement, Table A1 in Appendix 3 reports the mean total 
performance at the triad level in each part and each treatment depending on whether the least 
performer in the triad was or not exposed in part 3; it should in particular reveal whether 
exposure has or not a negative effect on the evolution of the total performance of triads between 
parts 3 and 4.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Table 4 attests of the presence of intrinsic motivation since subjects provide a positive level 
of effort in all parts although they are paid a fixed wage. Individual performance increases from 
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part 1 to part 2 and from part 2 to part 3 in each treatment (W tests, p<0.001). This cannot be the 
result of the pressure of social comparisons and the risk of exposure since the same evolution is 
observed in the No Feedback treatment. We find no significant difference in performance 
between the No Feedback and each other treatment in any part (MW tests, p>0.100). Moreover, 
the mean individual performance is not higher in the Heterogeneous than in the Homogenous 
treatment in any part (MW tests, p>0.100). Being matched with out-groups does not boost effort 
in part 3 to increase the negative externalities of one’s effort on out-groups. This analysis does 
not support Conjecture 4. 
 The evolution of individual performance between parts 3 and 4 is more diverse. Although 
there is no longer any risk of exposure, individual mean performance is higher in part 4 than in 
part 3 in the Minimal Identity treatment and the Heterogeneous treatments (W tests, p<0.001), but 
not in the other treatments (p>0.100). Interestingly, when we pool all the treatments (excluding 
the No Feedback treatment), we find that both the subjects with ranks 1 or 2 and the least 
performers who have not been exposed in part 3 increase their effort in part 4 (p<0.001), but not 
the least performers who have been exposed (p=0.626). This observation suggests that actual 
exposure tends to crowd-out intrinsic motivation or that public exposure left people 
uncomfortable and distracted, which reduced their performance in the last part. Table A1 in 
Appendix 3 also indicates that in both the Heterogeneous and the No Identity treatments, the 
mean performance of the triads increases between parts 3 and 4 when the least performer has not 
been exposed while it decreases when the least performer has been exposed. Wilcoxon tests 
comparing mean performance at the triad level in parts 3 and 4 indicate, however, that these 
effects are not significant (p>0.18 in all treatments, see Appendix 3). 
Table 5 reports the results of OLS regressions. In model (1), the dependent variable is the 
difference in the sum of performance levels at the triad level between part 4 and part 3. In model 
(2) it is the difference in the individual performance between part 4 and part 3 for the subjects 
who got rank 1 or 2. Model (3) is for the least performers. In all models, the independent 
variables include dummy variables for each treatment, with the No Feedback treatment as the 
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reference category, and an indicator of whether the least performer in the triad has been 
exposed.22 In models (2) and (3), they also include a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
the subject chose to pay the fee and the same demographic variables as in Table 3. Standard 
errors are clustered at the triad level in model (2).  
In contrast with the non-parametric statistics reported below Table A1, model (1) indicates 
that the evolution of the total performance of triads is significantly and negatively affected by the 
exposure of the least performer in part 3. Model (2) identifies no effect of the exposure of the 
least performer on the evolution of performance of the subjects who got rank 1 or 2. In contrast, 
model (3) reveals a significant negative effect of exposure in part 3 on the performance of the 
least performers in part 4, suggesting a decrease in their intrinsic motivation. Indeed, the 
performance of the exposed subjects decreases by 3.12 units between parts 3 and 4 compared to 
those who have been able to avoid exposure; this drives the negative tendency observed at the 
triad level in model (1). This partially supports Conjecture 2 and leads to our final result.  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Result 5: While social information on relative performance and group identity in general have 
little impact on performance, public exposure crowds-out the future intrinsic motivation of the 
least performers who have been exposed. 
This result partially supports Conjecture 2 and rejects Conjecture 4.  
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The importance of preserving self and others’ image in social interactions is well known from 
negotiations and diplomacy, but it has received little attention in economics. Our experiment 
shows that most people are willing to forego some money to avoid the public display of a poor 
relative performance. We interpret this behavior as evidence of the fear of losing face since 
                                                             
22 These two dummy variables take value 0 in the No Feedback treatment. We do not include the intensity of shame 
and happiness feelings in part 3 because they are not random variables and would create an endogeneity issue. We 
also tested models (2) and (3) after including a dummy variable indicating whether the exposed individual belongs to 
the minority in the Heterogeneous treatment. This variable was not significant. Therefore, we do not report these 
additional regressions. 
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individuals report shame and a lower level of happiness when they learn about their lower rank. 
We can exclude that this behavior captures only distaste for exposure, because when it is the best 
performer who is exposed, a much lower proportion of players are willing to avoid it. This result 
is striking since subjects were paid a fixed wage, the task we used is trivial, and performance 
helps no one. If people care about being exposed, this indicates that when there is intrinsic 
motivation the public exposure of a low rank is associated with a devaluated perception of the 
self in society. These findings suggest that anticipatory negative emotions inflict a moral cost to 
individuals that is higher than the monetary cost incurred to avoid exposure.  
A second major finding is that a majority of people sacrifice resources to preserve others’ 
face although there is no indication of future personal benefits from this action. This empathetic 
behavior suggests that altruism extends beyond the monetary realm, as individuals like to do 
good to others also in terms of image. In our experiment the cost incurred to avoid others’ 
exposure represents 10% of the income. It would be interesting to vary this cost in order to elicit 
the value of others’ face. In an extension of the paper we could also measure precisely the 
willingness to pay for saving face, using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. Another 
possible extension would be to allow people to pay to avoid the exposure of the least performer 
in another triad in order to identify to what extent feeling responsible for the rank of the least 
performer contributes to the willingness to pay to save others' face. 
Even in the No Identity treatment where triads are short-lived, more than one third of the 
subjects sacrifice resources for preserving others’ image. But the difference between the 
proportions in this treatment and in the three other treatments with more or less salient group 
identity indicates that saving face is not a simple moral norm. The main difference in the decision 
to sacrifice is not between the treatments in which painting identity is salient and the Minimal 
Identity treatment, but between the three treatments with fixed triads and the No Identity 
treatment. This difference may result from the combination of a higher social distance between 
subjects in the No Identity treatment and a lower concern for reputation for future coordination 
since triads are short-lived. Of course, subjects are not aware of the content of the next part in the 
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experiment when they decide whether or not to pay the fee, but they know that they will remain 
matched with the same persons until the end of the experiment. Teasing out the impact of social 
distance and reputation concerns suggests possible extensions. Rematching triads in the 
Homogeneous/Heterogeneous treatments in each part or allowing subjects to pay to avoid the 
exposure of an in-group or an out-group least performer in another triad would get rid of 
reputation concerns23.  
Our manipulation of the saliency of group identity in fixed triads has no direct effect on 
behavior. This result is in contrast to previous studies that have found an impact of the saliency of 
group identity (Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Chen, 2011). This 
may be due to the fact that in-group favoritism when triads are fixed would be perceived as a 
violation of a norm (Harris et al., 2012). It may also result from the fact that we conducted the 
study in China. Buchan et al. (2009) found that Chinese subjects sent and returned significantly 
more to out-groups than to in-groups in a trust game, while the opposite was found for American 
subjects. It may be more difficult to create a group identity in a collectivist culture where people 
have fewer in-groups than in individualistic societies (Triandis, 1995). In collectivist cultures 
(Hofstede, 1980), the goals of the group matter more than those of individuals, which could lead 
collectively oriented subjects to pay less attention to social distance. Another interpretation is that 
using the Klee-Kandinsky paintings as a support for generating a salient group identity may not 
be as effective in China as in occidental countries because individuals are less familiar with these 
painters. These interpretations are not, however, consistent with the fact that the subjects in our 
experiment report a relatively strong feeling of group membership. Although a few subjects 
mentioned during the group identity formation stage that they were not familiar with the style of 
the paintings, almost all subjects discussed with their group members about the differences 
between paintings regarding colors and shapes. Overall, a majority of subjects made two correct 
guesses about the two paintings in the group-solving task (69.05% in the Homogeneous treatment 
and 73.02% in the Heterogeneous treatment, which is significantly different from a random 
                                                             
23 We thank an anonymous reviewer for these suggestions. 
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response; binomial tests, p<0.001). This suggests that the chat was useful and contributed to the 
building of group identity. Cross-cultural replication studies would allow us to test whether in 
individualistic cultures people are less willing to sacrifice to save others’ face and whether social 
distance has a stronger impact on this decision. Our expectation is that people would still 
sacrifice to help others, as previous studies in social sciences have shown that face maintenance 
is important also in Western cultures (Ting-Toomey et al., 1991). 
Finally, we found some evidence that public exposure tends to crowd-out future intrinsic 
motivation of individuals who had been publicly exposed as poor performers, at least in the short 
run. This suggests that providing feedback about relative performance may sometimes encourage 
people to work harder, but when information is disseminated it also generates negative emotions, 
the longer-term effects of which on individuals’ performance are still to be explored. We 
acknowledge that in our experiment, ranking occurs periodically whereas shaming occurs once. 
In real settings, public exposure of relative performance may last longer and thus, our results on 
the importance of face and its impact on the motivation and the performance of the least 
performers may be underestimated by design. It would make sense to study whether individuals 
who feel they have lost face because of public rankings become less willing to identify 
themselves with their group in future interactions. In this experiment, we only considered the 
case when shaming affects an individual, but shaming may be collective when it involves a 
ranking of organizations (schools, universities, companies). It would be interesting to explore 
how shaming affects efficiency and through which mechanisms when it is collective rather than 
individual, as in this case the loss of utility may derive from a lower identification to the group 
than from a downgraded image. This is left for further investigation.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Summary of sessions 
Treatments Number of sessions  
  Total     With belief elicitation 







































Table 2. Percentages of participants paying the fee to avoid the public exposure of the least 
performers, by treatment and by performance rank, and actual exposure  
 
Treatments Rank 1 
in part 3 
Rank 2  
in part 3 
Rank 3 
in part 3 
% of least 
performers 
exposed 
Minimal Identity  
Homogenous  
Heterogeneous  
     - KKk or kkK 
     - Kkk or kKK 
     - KkK or kKk 





























Total 50.00% (66/132) 56.06% (74/132) 73.48% (97/132) 38.64% (51/132) 
Note: “K” is for the Kandinsky group, “k” for Klee group. “KKk or kkK” reads as follows: in the triad, the 
participants who get the first and the second ranks have the same group identity while the least performer has 





Table 3. Determinants of the decision to pay the fee to avoid the public exposure of the least 
performer  
Dependent variable:                                                                    
Decision to pay the fee                        











1 and 2 
(4) 
Ranks 1 and 
2 - Hetero. T. 
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No Identity treatment 
 
i is Rank 2 in part 3 
i is Rank 1 in part 3 
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Heterogeneous T. * Rank 3 
is an out-group 
Rank 3 is i’s in-group  
Rank 3 is the only out-group 
 
Heterogeneous T. * 
i matched with 2 out-groups 
Belief elicitation 
 
Belief elicitation * 
Belief: 1 other pays 
Belief elicitation *  
Belief: 2 others pay 
Belief elicitation *  
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Notes: The Table reports marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the triad level, except in model (3). 
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In models (1), (2) and (4), two observations are missing because the level of wealth has not been recorded. *** 
indicate significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. In models (1), (2) and (4), two 
observations are missing because the level of wealth has not been recorded. 
Table 4. Mean performance, by part and by treatment  
 Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Part 4   N 
No Feedback treatment 128.54 (16.09)  133.50 (17.16) 138.58 (15.34) 140.17 (13.01) 24 
Minimal Identity treatment 
Homogenous treatment 
Heterogeneous treatment 





















Least performers (excl. 
No Feedback treatment)  
   - Not exposed 
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Note: N: number of subjects. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Table 5. Determinants of the evolution of performance between part 3 and part 4, depending 
          on rank in part 3 
Dependent variable:                                                                    
Performance in part 4 




Rank 1 or 2
in part 3 
(2) 
Rank 3  
in part 3 
(3) 
No Feedback treatment 
Minimal Identity treatment 
Homogenous treatment 
Heterogeneous treatment 
No Identity treatment 
Chose to pay the fee 
Exposure of rank 3 in part 3 
Demographic variables 








































Note: Table 5 reports OLS models. In model (2), standard errors are clustered at the triad level. In model (2), two 





















Figure 1. Shame intensity, by performance rank, in all treatments (N=396) 
















Rank3. not. publicly. exposed
Rank3.publicly.exposed
 
Figure 2. Happiness intensity, by performance rank, in all treatments (N=396) 
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ON LINE APPENDIX 1 – Instructions for the Minimal Identity treatment (translated into 
Chinese) 
We thank you for participating in this experiment in decision-making. It is forbidden to talk to the other participants 
throughout the session.  
We will first ask you to describe the feelings you experience right now. Your screen will display a series of 10 
statements. For each statement, we ask you to choose a number between 1 and 7 (included) to describe how you feel 
right now.  
The choice of a higher number indicates that you experience this feeling with a higher intensity. For example, choosing 
number 1 indicates that you do not experience this feeling at all. At the opposite, choosing number 7 indicates that you 
experience this feeling with a very high intensity. Intermediate values are indicated by the choice of intermediate 
numbers.   
Do not spend too much time on any one statement; simply choose the number which seems to describe your present 
feelings best. 
The 10 proposed statements are the following: 
- I feel angry 
- I feel contempt 
- I feel ashamed 
- I feel envious 
- I feel sad 
- I feel happy 
- I feel guilty 
- I feel grateful 
- I feel fearful 
- I feel relieved 
-------- 
 
Instructions (cont’d) (distributed after completion of the initial elicitation of feelings) 
The remaining of this session consists of several parts. You will receive the instructions for each part after completing 
the previous part. 
During these parts, the amount of money you will earn may depend upon your actions and the actions of the other 
participants you will interact with. Throughout the session, your earnings will be given in ECU (Experimental 
Currency Units). At the end of the session, your total earnings in ECU will be the sum of your payoffs earned in each 
part. These earnings will be converted into RMB at the rate: 
10 ECU = 1 RMB 
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the session.  
Part 1 
At the beginning of this part and throughout the session, the participants are grouped into triads. The composition of 
your triad will remain constant throughout the session. You will not be informed on the identity of the two other 
members of your triad.  
During this part, we ask you to perform a task on your computer during 4 minutes. This task consists of moving apples 
into a basket with your mouse. 
Each apple moved into the basket will increase your score by one unit. Your current score (i.e. the current number of 
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apples in the basket) as well as the remaining time will be displayed on your screen continuously.  
Once the 4 minutes have elapsed, your screen will remind you your score in this part.  You will not be informed of the 
scores of your two other triad members.  
You will be paid 100 ECU in this part.  
Before starting performing the task, you will be allowed to practice this task during 2 minutes. The performance in this 
practice period will not be taken into account in your score of this part. 
At the end of this part, a questionnaire about your current feelings will be displayed on your computer screen. To fill 
out this questionnaire, the rules are the same as previously. 
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. We will answer to your questions 
privately. 
------ 
Part 2 (distributed after completion of the previous part) 
In this part, the composition of your triad is the same as in the previous part. 
We ask you to perform the same task on your computer as previously during 4 minutes. You will be paid 100 ECU in 
this part.  
The difference with the previous part is that once the 4 minutes have elapsed, your screen will display your score and 
your rank within the triad in this part. 
The rank 1 will be assigned to the triad member who has performed the highest score. 
The rank 3 will be assigned to the member who has performed the lowest score. 
The rank 2 will be assigned to the member who has performed the intermediate score. 
In case of ties between two or three triad members, the ranks will be assigned randomly between the ties.  
You will be informed of the score and the rank of each of your two other triad members.  
Last, a questionnaire about your current feelings will be displayed on your computer screen.  
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. We will answer to your questions 
privately. 
------ 
Part 3 (distributed after completion of the previous part) 
In this part, the composition of your triad is the same as in the previous parts. We ask you to perform the same task on 
your computer as previously during 4 minutes. You will be paid 100 ECU in this part. Once the 4 minutes have elapsed, 
your screen will display your score and your rank within the triad, as well as the score and the rank of each of the two 
other triad members. 
A difference with the previous part lies in the fact that the participants who have got rank 3 (the lowest score) in each 
triad will be requested to stand up, to move forward to the front of the room, one by one, before being sent back to their 
seat. 
However, you will be able to modify the regular process by your decisions. Indeed, after being informed on the 
assignment of ranks and before participants with rank 3 (the lowest score) are called to the front of the room, you will 
decide whether you let the regular process apply or whether you prefer that the member of your triad who has got rank 
3 is not called to the front of the room. 
- If you are willing that the regular process applies, press « VALIDATE». 
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- If you are not willing that the member of your triad with rank 3 is called to the front of the room, press «NO STAND 
UP » and validate your decision. 
If at least two members of the triad have pressed « NO STAND UP », the member of your triad who has got rank 3 will 
not be called and will not be identified in the room. In this case, the members who have chosen « NO STAND UP » will 
pay a cost of 10 ECU each that will be deducted from their payoff in this part. 
In all the other cases, the regular process applies. The member of your triad with rank 3 will be called to the front of the 
room. Payoffs will not be modified. 
You will be informed of the decision of each of your triad members, together with their score and their rank. 
A questionnaire about your current feelings will be displayed on your computer screen both after you have made your 
decision and after the participants with rank 3 have come back to their seat.  
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. We will answer to your questions 
privately. 
------ 
Part 4 (distributed after completion of the previous part) 
The rules that apply in this part are the same as in Part 2. We ask you to perform the same task as previously during 4 
minutes. You will be paid 100 ECU in this part. Once the 4 minutes have elapsed, your screen will display your score 
and your rank within the triad in this part. You will be also informed of the score and the rank of each of the two other 
triad members. Then, a questionnaire about your current feelings will be displayed on your computer screen.  
Finally, you will be requested to fill out a post-experimental questionnaire and you will be invited to proceed to the 




ON LINE APPENDIX 2 – Instructions for the Homogenous and Heterogeneous treatments 
(translated into Chinese) 
We thank you for participating in this experiment in decision-making. It is forbidden to talk to the other participants 
throughout the session.  
We will first ask you to describe the feelings you experience right now. Your screen will display a series of 10 
statements. For each statement, we ask you to choose one number between 1 and 7 (included) to describe how you feel 
right now.  
The choice of a higher number indicates that you experience this feeling with a higher intensity. For example, choosing 
number 1 indicates that you do not experience this feeling at all. At the opposite, choosing number 7 indicates that you 
experience this feeling with a very high intensity. Intermediate values are indicated by the choice of intermediate 
numbers.   
Do not spend too much time on any one statement; simply choose the number which seems to describe your present 
feelings best. 
The 10 proposed statements are the following: 
- I feel angry 
- I feel contempt 
- I feel ashamed 
- I feel envious 
- I feel sad 
- I feel happy 
- I feel guilty 
- I feel grateful 
- I feel fearful 
- I feel relieved 
-------- 
Instructions (cont’d) (distributed after completion of the initial elicitation of feelings) 
The remaining of this session consists of several parts. You will receive the instructions for each part after completing 
the previous part. 
During these parts, the amount of money you will earn may depend upon your actions and the actions of the other 
participants you will interact with. Throughout the session, your earnings will be given in ECU (Experimental 
Currency Units). At the end of the session, your total earnings in ECU will be the sum of your payoffs earned in each 
part. These earnings will be converted into RMB at the rate: 
10 ECU = 1 RMB 
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the session.  
Preliminary part 
At the beginning of this part and for the remainder of the session, the participants will be classified into one of two 
groups of equal size. Each group is called after the name of an artist: Klee or Kandinsky. You will be randomly 
assigned to one of these two groups, either the Klee group, or the Kandinsky group. You will belong to the same group 
throughout the session. 
After informing you about your group membership, your screen will display five pairs of paintings. In each pair, a 
painting has been made by Klee, the other one by Kandinsky. Your screen will indicate which artist has painted each 
painting. Each pair of paintings will be displayed during 20 seconds. 
After observing these five pairs of paintings, your screen will successively display two more paintings and you will be 
asked to select the artist who you think made each painting, respectively (Klee or Kandinsky). Each correct answer will 
pay you 50 ECU. 
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You may get help from or help other members in your own group while answering the two questions successively. 
Indeed, before submitting each of your answers, you can use a group chat program during 3 minutes to get help from or 
offer help to other members in your own group.  
Except for the following restrictions, you can type whatever you want in the lower box of the chat program: 
- Please do not identify yourself or send any information that could be used to identify you (age, gender, 
school, …), 
- Please refrain from using obscene or offensive language.  
To send a message to your group members, simply press the  button.  
Your messages will be shared only with the members of your own group. You will not be able to see the messages 
exchanged among the other group. People in the other group will not see the messages from your own group either. 
Once the communication time has elapsed, you will be requested to enter your answer about the artist you think has 
made the painting displayed on your screen (Klee or Kandinsky). 
You will be informed at the end of the session whether your answers were correct or not.  
Once you have submitted your two answers, a questionnaire on your current feelings will be displayed on your 
computer screen. To fill out this questionnaire, the rules are the same as previously. 
Please read these instructions again. If you have any question on these instructions, please raise your hand. We will 
answer your questions privately. 
------ 
Part 1 
At the beginning of this part and throughout the session, the participants are grouped into triads. The composition of 
your triad will remain constant throughout the session. You will not be informed on the identity of the other 
members of your triad. In contrast, you will be informed of the group of each of the two other triad members (Klee or 
Kandinsky); similarly, your triad members will learn your group. 
During this part, we ask you to perform a task on your computer during 4 minutes. This task consists of moving apples 
into a basket with your mouse. 
Each apple moved into the basket will increase your score by one unit. Your current score (i.e. the current number of 
apples in the basket) as well as the remaining time will be displayed on your screen continuously.  
Once the 4 minutes have elapsed, your screen will remind you your score in this part. You will not be informed of the 
scores of your two other triad members.  
You will be paid 100 ECU in this part.  
Before starting performing the task, you will be allowed to practice this task during 2 minutes. The performance in this 
practice period will not be taken into account in your score of this part. 
At the end of this part, a questionnaire about your current feelings will be displayed on your computer screen.  
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. We will answer to your questions 
privately. 
------ 
Part 2 (distributed after completion of the previous part) 
In this part, the composition of your triad is the same as in the previous part. We ask you to perform the same task on 
your computer as previously during 4 minutes. You will be paid 100 ECU in this part.  
The difference with the previous part is that once the 4 minutes have elapsed, your screen will display your score and 
your rank within the triad in this part. 
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The rank 1 will be assigned to the triad member who has performed the highest score. 
The rank 3 will be assigned to the member who has performed the lowest score. 
The rank 2 will be assigned to the member who has performed the intermediate score. 
In case of ties between two or three triad members, the ranks will be assigned randomly between the ties.  
You will be informed of the group (Klee or Kandinsky), the score and the rank of each of your two other triad members. 
Last, a questionnaire about your current feelings will be displayed on your computer screen.  
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. We will answer to your questions 
privately. 
------ 
Part 3 (distributed after completion of the previous part) 
In this part, the composition of your triad is the same as in the previous parts. We ask you to perform the same task on 
your computer as previously during 4 minutes. You will be paid 100 ECU in this part.  
Once the 4 minutes have elapsed, your screen will display your score and your rank within the triad, as well as the 
group (Klee or Kandinsky), the score and the rank of each of the two other triad members. 
A difference with the previous part lies in the fact that the participants who have got rank 3 (the lowest score) in each 
triad will be requested to stand up, to move forward to the front of the room, one by one, and then to give the name of 
their group (Klee or Kandinsky) aloud before being sent back to their seat. 
However, you will be able to modify the regular process by your decisions. Indeed, after being informed on the 
assignment of ranks and before participants with rank 3 (the lowest score) are called to the front of the room, you will 
decide whether you let the regular process apply or whether you prefer that the member of your triad who has got rank 
3 is not called to the front of the room. 
- If you are willing that the regular process applies, press « VALIDATE». 
- If you are not willing that the member of your triad with rank 3 is called to the front of the room, press 
«NO STAND UP » and validate your decision. 
If at least two members of the triad have pressed « NO STAND UP », the member of your triad who has got rank 3 will 
not be called and will not be identified in the room. In this case, the members who have chosen « NO STAND UP » will 
pay a cost of 10 ECU each that will be deducted from their payoff in this part. 
In all the other cases, the regular process applies. The member of your triad with rank 3 will be called to the front of the 
room, will give the name of his group aloud and will come back to his seat. Payoffs will not be modified. 
You will be informed of the decision of each of your triad members, together with their group, their score and their 
rank. 
A questionnaire about your feelings will be displayed on your computer screen both after you have made your decision 
and after the participants with rank 3 have come back to their seat.  
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. We will answer to your questions 
privately. 
------ 
Part 4 (distributed after completion of the previous part) 
The rules that apply in this part are the same as in part 2. We ask you to perform the same task as previously during 4 
minutes. You will be paid 100 ECU in this part.  
Once the 4 minutes have elapsed, your screen will display your score and your rank within the triad in this part. You 
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will be also informed of the group (Klee or Kandinsky), the score and the rank of each of the two other triad members. 
Then, a questionnaire about your current feelings will be displayed on your computer screen. 




ON LINE APPENDIX 3. Table A1. Mean performance at the triad level, by part and by treatment 
 Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Part 4   N 
Minimal Identity treatment 
- Not exposed 

















- Not exposed 

















- Not exposed 
















No Identity treatment 
- Not exposed 

















Note: Table A1 reports the mean total performance at the triad level in each part, depending on the treatment 
and on whether the least performer in the triad has or not been exposed in part 3. N indicates the number of 
triads in each condition. Standard deviations are in parentheses. In the No Identity treatment, mean 
performance at the triad level across parts is based on the triad as formed in part 3. 
 
P-values from Wilcoxon tests comparing performance at the triad level between part 3 and part 4, 
by treatment 
Treatments In case of exposure  
of the least performer 
In case of no exposure  
of the least performer 
Minimal Identity 0.659 0.178 
Homogenous 0.644 0.959 







Note: In the No Identity treatment, triads are reformed randomly at the beginning of each part; for the test, 
however, we compare performance in part 3 and part 4 at the triad level as composed in part 3. In the No 
Feedback treatment, subjects are not matched in triads; therefore, in this treatment the test is conducted at the 
individual level. 
 
